INTRODUCTION
The law of armed force is typically categorized in two bodies of law, jus ad bellum (the law on recourse to force) andjus in bello (the law governing the conduct of hostilities).' Historically, however, Traces of a tripartite conception may be found in different traditions of thought. St. Augustine linked war to the post-war goal of peace in his book City of God which became one of the most respected and frequently-cited books of Church history. 4 This thinking was refined by proponents of the just war theory, such as Francisco de Vitoria, the founder of the School of Salamanca, and scholastic Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco Sudrez (1621).' These scholars made a compelling argument: If a war has a just cause, and is fought justly, it must also lead to a just post-war settlement. 6 Hugo Grotius developed a more refined account of this approach in On the Law of War and Peace, which secularized just war theory on the basis of principles of natural law which were held to be binding on all people and nations regardless of local custom. 7 Book III of On the Law of War and Peace includes not only rules governing the conduct of war, but practical principles on just war termination, such as rules on surrender, good faith, and interpretation 6. See SUAREz, supra note 5, at 838-40 (advocating the broad view that a sovereign has no reason to continue hostilities where "full and sufficient satisfaction is voluntarily offered" by the opposing sovereign); DE VICTORIA, supra note 5, at 185-87 (providing basic rules for the just seizure of a conquered enemy's property and payment of tribute).
See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE: THREE BOOKS] (1625), translated in 3 THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 52 (James B. Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1925) (1913) (claiming that the first principles of nature favor war, as the "end and aim of war" is "the preservation of life and limb, and the keeping or acquiring of things useful to life").
of peace treaties.' This conception was later taken up in the eighteenth century in the natural law-based works on the law of nations by Christian von Wolff and Emer de Vattel. 9 Immanuel Kant completed the tripdichon and distinguished three categories: Right to War (Recht zum Krieg), Right in War (Recht im Krieg) , and Right after War (Recht nach dem Krieg)."° Kant associated the "law after war" with substantive principles of justice, such as the fairness of peace settlements, respect of the sovereignty of the vanquished state, and limits on the punishment of people (for example, through excessive reparation). " Some of these principles foreshadow traces of modern peacemaking. Surprisingly, this "third leg" in the theory of warfare disappeared in the conceptualization of the laws of war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 2 Thus, jus in bello was codified, then jus ad bellum. 3 In contrast, jus post bellum did not receive much attention. Treatises at the beginning of the twentieth century treated the concept in a cursory fashion, if at all.' 4 This finding begs some questions about the structure of international law and legal scholarship in the twentieth century. How did this discrepancy between just war theory and the theorization of the law of armed force emerge? Why was the absence of jus post bellum not perceived as a gap in the structure of international law? 8. Id . at 804-3 1.
See E. DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS]
(1758), translated in 3 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 14 (James B. Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) (stating that natural law empowers a nation to do "whatever is necessary for selfpreservation"). To what extent is it necessary to re-think some of these categorizations today?
This Article seeks to shed a closer light on these questions from an inter-disciplinary perspective. Part I analyzes some of the features and contours of jus post bellum as a domain of scholarship. It examines why the idea ofjus post bellum has been neglected in legal scholarship and why it should be taken seriously in the twentieth century.
Part II highlights some of the outstanding scholarship problems. An account of the existing literature indicates that jus post bellum is treated differently in various disciplines, for example, between legal scholars and just war theorists, and sometimes even within the very same discipline." 5 At least three areas appear to require further clarification if the concept ofjus post bellum is to be developed from a theoretical principle into a normative framework for the organization of the transition from conflict to peace: the nature of the concept, its substantive content, and its operation.
I. JUS POST BELLUM AS A DOMAIN OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the period of transition from conflict to peace has been neglected in legal science.
1 6 Works by scholars such as Oppenheim 7 and Phillipson 8 outlined a number of principles guiding the ending of wars and the formation of treaties of peace. However, treatises of international law remained largely silent on the question of whether, and to what extent, rules of international law shape the very contents and grand strategies of This omission may be explained by several historical factors-the gradual development of international law and the case-by-case treatment of major peace settlements in the twentieth century 2°-but, at the same time, it has some deeper structural reasons.
A. CAUSES OF SCHOLARLY DISREGARD
At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was difficult to conceive of the period of transition from war to peace as a separate normative paradigm because international law itself was seen as bipolar system focused on the strict distinction between states of war and peace. International law was composed of two sets of rules: the law of peace and the law of war. Both types of rules were treated as alternative frameworks. The law of peace was understood as the body of law governing the normal state of affairs between states, while war was viewed as a distinct concept which gave rise to a different body of legal rules governing the relations between belligerents. 2 War and peace were seen as "ying" and "yang," namely as two aggregates which complemented each other. However, the grey zone between these two poles, namely the transition from war to peace, was not treated as a paradigm in terms of law. 22 This diametrical opposition is epitomized in the first editions of Oppenheim's famous treatise on international law which categorically distinguished the law of war and the law of peace. 23 This finding coincides with a further systemic reason. The absence of legal rules and principles was, to a certain extent, a corollary of a prevailing conception of international law as jus inter gentes, rather than a jus gentium. 25 In a legal order that was centered on the interests of states and interstate relations, peacemaking itself largely was conceived as a process governed by the discretion of states. z6 The Treaty of Versailles, for instance, contained several traces of modernity, such as the reference to the criminal accountability of the German emperor, provisions for the protection of national minorities, and integration of the founding instrument of the League of Nations into the peace settlement. 27 However, the goal of sustainable peacemaking was overshadowed by the political interests (Machtpolitik) of the victorious powers. 28 The terms of the agreement were essentially set by a bargaining process of the victors of the rights and obligations of the vanquished. 29 Reparations were punitive to the extent that they were based on "war guilt." 3 267-68 (1920) (criticizing the severe financial burdens and cessions of territory within the treaty determination was not viewed as a binding legal rule, but as a flexible principle. 3 ' It had to yield where it conflicted with overriding strategic interests of the victorious powers. 3 2 Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the process of peacemaking after war itself was not codified in the inter-war period when jus ad bellum and jus in bello began to emerge as legal notions.
The peace settlements after World War II present a slightly more nuanced picture. Human rights clauses and provisions for criminal adjudication became integral features of peace treaties with former enemy powers. 33 In the cases of Germany and Japan, victory was as a threat to the financial equilibrium of Europe, and noting that "for at least a generation[J ... Germany cannot be trusted with even a modicum of prosperity").
31. See KNUDSON, supra note 27, at 37-38 (acknowledging that the victorious powers did not permit Germany to participate in framing the treaty and excluded Germany from membership in the League at its inception).
32. In this latter context, the notion ofjus post bellum has also gained some prominence in legal doctrine. Jus post bellum is increasingly viewed by legal scholars as a framework to deal with the challenges of state-building and transformation after intervention. 43 Recently, it has been associated with different phenomena such as transformative occupation, 44 the conduct of legislative reform in post-conflict zones, 45 or the consolidation of the rule of law after intervention more generally. 46 These observations provide evidence that the law of occupation is increasingly perceived as an insufficient answer to the legal challenges of peace-building. But it is necessary to go a step further. The fundamental question is whether jus post bellum can be understood in a broader normative sense, namely not only as a moral principle or a legal catchword, but as a concept which regulates conflicts of norms and the relationship between different actors in conflict-related situations of transition. 
See
Boon, supra note 2, at 287 (arguing that "a just post bellum based on the principles of trusteeship, accountability, and proportionality is necessary to establish the rule of law" in occupied territories). 47. Roberts views "an emerging or future jus post bellum" as a basis to deal with shortcomings of jus in bello. See Roberts, supra note 44, at 619 (reasoning that jus post bellum could be used to resolve the tension that exists in current international law with regard to the idea of "military intervention with a transformative purpose"). For the argument that the idea ofjus post bellum cannot factors: certain structural changes in the international legal order, international practice in the field of peacemaking, and apparent inadequacies in the existing architecture of the law of armed force.
Erosion of the War/Peace Dichotomy
First, the classical war/peace dichotomy has lost its raison d'tre with the outlawry of war and the blurring of the boundaries between conflict and peace. 48 Traces of the historic distinction between war and peace are still present in some distinct areas of law, like the effects of war on the law of treaties. 49 However, the applicability of law no longer depends on the recognition of a state of war or a state of peace. 50 International law comes into play in situations which are neither declared war nor part of peacetime relations, such as threats to the peace. 5 The most evident example is internal armed violence, which according to recent statistics constitutes ninety-five percent of armed violence in the last decade. 2 Transitions from conflict to peace are governed by a conglomerate of rules and principles from different areas of law. International military forces, for instance, which are traditionally bound by wartime obligations, may be bound to respect certain peacetime standards (such as habeas corpus guarantees), when exercising public authority in a post-conflict environment. 3 Civilian authorities, by simply be inserted into a modem context, but first must be "translated from a moral principle into a legal notion," see Stahn, supra note 2, at 936-37.
48. 50. See Layton, supra note 48, at 98 (finding that "the outbreak of war does not necessarily terminate treaty obligations").
51. See id. at 109 (discussing the applicability of the U.N. Charter to hostilities short of war, including "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression"); U.N. Charter ch. VII. 
International Practice
Second, and more importantly, one may witness the crystallization of certain rules and institutional frameworks for the organization of peace in international practice. 5 Most modern peace treaties are framed on the basis of the assumption that the ending of hostilities requires not only measures to terminate conflict, but active steps to build peace. 56 This is reflected in the move from a negative to a positive conception of peace under the U.N. Charter, the peacemaking practice of the Security Council after the revitalization of the collective security after the Cold War, and practice in the field of development assistance, like human rights and democracy clauses. 57 In some contemporary documents, foreign nations have been deemed to hold a "shared responsibility" for human security. 5 The rise of human rights obligations and growing limitations on sovereignty and non-intervention have not only changed the attitude toward the ending of conflicts, but have also set certain benchmarks for behavior. 6 3 The process of peacemaking itself has become a domain of international attention and regulatory action.A This is evidenced by the regulatory practice of the U.N. Security Council. It is also evidenced by the development of law and practice concerning the accountability of international organizations and peace support operations, 65 and accountability when exercising public authority. 68 Moreover, some of the grand strategies of peacemaking-like democratization and economic liberalization-are governed by a network of obligations flowing from the law of international organizations, multilateral treaty commitments, or donor conditionality. 69 It is therefore appropriate and timely to treat peacemaking not only as a political process, but also a legal phenomenon.
On the Use of a Jus Post Bellum
This postulate is not reflected in the current architecture of international law. The contemporary law of armed force continues to be based on the traditional distinction betweenjus ad bellum andjus in bello. 7° The process of peacemaking after conflict is not reflected as a separate paradigm. 7 An extension of the existing categories is not without risks. One of the dangers is that post bellum motives might be used as a pretext for validating of questionable uses of force. However, if properly construed, ajus post bellum may ultimately provide certain benefits.
a. Closing a Normative Gap
A jus post bellum might, first of all, fill a certain normative gap. At present, there is no organizing framework for transitions from conflict to peace. It is often difficult to ascertain which rules apply to domestic and international actors, since the international and the domestic legal order converge in processes of transition. Acts of international actors may directly become of the domestic legal system, while acts of domestic authorities may be subject to increased international scrutiny. Moreover, there is no clear guidance as to how possible conflicts between applicable norms and principles of international law-human rights law as opposed to international humanitarian law--ought to be resolved."
The articulation of a jus post bellum may mitigate these gaps. It may help identify rules of conflict and set limitations to the conduct of international actors. It may also provide guidance concerning the legal policy choices to be made in light of conflicting norms in situations of transition. 7 3 b. Closing a Systemic Gap Second, a re-thinking of the existing categories might serve a certain systemic function. In contemporary international law, the rules governing recourse to force and the prospects of peacemaking after conflict are widely regarded as different paradigms. Each category is treated as its own distinct universe. This vision is open to challenge in an era in which the very justification for the use of force is tied to the very purpose of restoring or enhancing sustainable peace. One of the advantages of a contemporary jus post bellum is that it might establish a closer nexus between the justification and motive of the use of force and the corresponding responsibilities in the aftermath of intervention 74 Ajus post bellum might require states and international actors to assess the implications of the recourse to force on the post-intervention phase before deciding whether or not to use force in the first place. Moreover, it may compel intervening powers to contemplate and provide the necessary institutional frameworks to ensure sustainable peacemaking after recourse to force. 75 The case for a jus post bellum is to some extent inherent in the conception of jus ad bellum. 76 Even under jus ad bellum, it is sometimes not enough to establish that the motives which led to the recourse to force pursued a lawful and commonly accepted purpose. 77 A use of force in self-defense or under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter may have to be followed by action that is appropriate and capable of removing the threat that motivated the use of force by virtue of the principle of proportionality. 7 " If it is clear at the outset that an invention will lead to a violent insurgency which may prevent the establishment of a just peace, the jus post bellum might provide an argument not to resort to war in the first place.
A jus post bellum might also set certain legal constraints and guidelines for the exercise of public authority in a subsequent postconflict engagement. 7 9 It "might provide the necessary parameters and benchmarks to determine whether the respective goals have been implemented in a fair and effective manner and in accordance with the law." 80 
c. Reconfiguring Jus in Bello
Last but not least, the development of post-conflict law may have certain implications for the contemporary jus in bello. The jus in bello is designed to address temporary power vacuums after conflict. Its focus lies on the maintenance of public security and order, as well as the protection of the interests of domestic actors. It contains only a ''nucleus" of legal principles devoted to the ending of hostilities and the re-establishment of peace. The move towards a jus post bellum might prevent an artificial merger and conflation of the jus in bello with objectives (like state-building or transformation after intervention) that it is ill-suited to achieve in light of its limited temporal scope of application and its traditional focus on the obligations of armed forces. 82 Considerations of fair and just peace may be taken into account in an indirect fashion under a tripartite conception of the law of armed force. They might serve as an overarching umbrella for the limitation of the aims and effects of armed conflict. The jus post bellum would require the respective parties to conduct their hostilities in a manner which does not defeat the prospects of a fair and just peace settlement after the conflict. 8 3 I. THE SCHOLARSHIP AGENDA Although these considerations make it worthwhile to revive the idea of a jus post bellum in modem international law, the concept requires further refinement from a conceptual perspective. At least three areas need further clarification ifjus post bellum is to be taken seriously as a domain of scholarship, namely the general meaning of the concept, its content, and its operation.
A. THE MEANING OF THE CONCEPT
There is some agreement that the concept of jus post bellurn is meant to address challenges of conflict termination and peacemaking 82. Stahn, supra note 2, at 942-43. 83. Id. which are not covered by jus ad bellum or jus in bello. 84 The notion has been defined in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as a concept which that "seeks to regulate the ending of wars and to ease the transition from war back to peace."85 However, until present the concept has still had different meanings to different audiences.
Foundation
One of the dilemmas of the contemporary discourse overjus post bellurn is the disregard and occasional misperception of the legal domain. This shortcoming has caused confusion about the foundation ofjus post bellum.
a. Beyond Morality
Jus post bellum has been mostly considered as a moral paradigm, namely as an extension of just war theory. 86 Part of the justification for this approach has been derived from an assumed lack of legal rules. It has been argued that the issue of morality becomes so important because " [t] here is little international law here-save occupation law and perhaps the human rights treaties." 87 The use of extra-legal parameters has thus been invoked as an argument to strengthen the case for moral reflection on intervention. 88 This argument needs to be refined. A shift from law to morality is visible and defendable in areas where the parameters of law itself are in flux or dispute, such as in the context of humanitarian 84. See Boon, supra note 2, at 291-92 (stating that jus post bellum has distinct end goals of establishing security, creating the political and economic basis for independence, and promoting a democratic process). 85 intervention. 9 In this area, recourse to extra-legal justifications has even become an integral part of the vocabulary of international law. 90 However, this does not mean that a potential jus post bellum must be exclusively of a moral nature. 91 There is some room to argue that international law contains an existing pool of norms and principles, which goes beyond a moral responsibility after conflict. The substantive components of peacemaking are no longer exclusively determined by the discretion and contractual liberty of the warring factions, but are governed by certain norms and standards of international law derived from different fields of law and legal practice. 9 2 Some of these obligations are tied to factual considerations such as effective control, and are therefore partly beyond the will of states. This network of law and regulations may be deemed to form the foundations of 'Jus" in the legal sense, which complements the jus post bellum under just war theory. The current theorization of the concept suffers further from a fragmented and sector-specific vision of jus post bellum by legal scholars. The notion has been used to describe partially different legal paradigms. International humanitarian lawyers tend to viewjus post bellum primarily as an alternative, as in, a "law of post-war reconstruction." 94 Criminal lawyers would associate jus post bellum more closely with the concept of justice after war, and treat it primarily under the label of criminal accountability. 95 Human rights lawyers would regard it as a surrogate framework of law in situations of emergency. 96 Others again might view it as a nucleus of a "responsibility to rebuild" after military intervention.
This piecemeal approach is misguided. An area-specific vision of jus post bellum is neither in line with the historic tradition of the notion, nor helpful from a systemic point of view. It fails to address one of the principal dilemmas of contemporary international law, namely to define the interplay between different legal orders and bodies of law in situations of transition. 97 It is more appropriate to understand jus post bellum in a holistic sense, namely as a broader regulatory framework, which contains not only substantive legal 96. See Williams & Caldwell, supra note 3, at 317-18 (laying out four human rights-based principles ofjus post bellum that are transitional in nature and aimed at restoring the "status quo ante bellum"). In their treatment of jus post bellum, Williams and Caldwell argue that "[a] just peace exists when the human rights of those involved in the war, on both sides, are more secure than they were before the war." Id. at 309.
97. See Stahn, supra note 2, at 924 (arguing that it is "increasingly clear that some of the problems arising in the period of transition from conflict to peace cannot be addressed by a simple application of the 'law of peace' or the 'laws of war', but require 'situation-specific' adjustments, such as organizing frameworks and principles which are specifically geared towards the management of situations of transition between conflict and peace").
rules and principles governing transitions from conflict to peace, but also rules on their interplay and relationship in case of conflict. 98 
Scope of Application
Ifjus post bellum is developed into a broader concept of law, it is further necessary to define its scope of application. It must, in particular, be specified in which circumstances jus post bellum comes into play.
According to its traditional understanding, jus post bellum is triggered by inter-state wars. Any modern perspective of this concept would be markedly different from that which occupied the minds of the scholars who first addressed this area. Today, the very notion itself is, to some extent, a misnomer. A modern jus post bellum must apply after events other than classical wars. It would need to be connected to the broader notion of international armed conflicts and even certain kinds of interventions that are not directly contemplated by the jus in bello under the Geneva Conventions, such as enforcement action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 9 9 In addition, ajus post bellum would have to apply in the aftermath of civil wars.'° Internal armed violence is covered by the contemporary jus in bello 1 ' and has been the object of increased 98. See id. at 937-38, 941-42 (discussing the entangled norms that make up this "regulatory framework," and proposing a holistic law that connectsjus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum to decrease the "uncertainty about applicable law [and] the interplay of different structural frameworks . . . in a post conflict environment"). Sometimes, different legal provisions may conflict or compete with each other. For example, an immediate duty to prosecute may conflict with the parallel responsibility of the host state to protect the security of its people. An individual's right of access to a court may conflict with the immunity of international organizations that exercise public authority in a post-conflict territory. Such conflicts must be solved by way of a hierarchy of norms or a balancing of principles. "Some norms (for instance, jus cogens prohibitions) constitute 'hard' law ('rules'). They are applicable 'in an all-or nothing fashion'. Others are based on broader principles which may be balanced against each other. . . ." Id. at 937-
38.
99. See Roberts, supra note 44, at 619 (noting that jus post bellum also arises "after a foreign military intervention").
100. Id. At the same time, the temporal scope of application of jus post bellum must be redefined. Historically, the dividing line between war and peace has been the conclusion of a peace treaty. 0 3 Today, however, reality is more complex. A conflict can no longer be temporally defined simply by looking at the date of signature of the relevant peace treaty, nor will the conclusion of a peace treaty necessarily mean the definitive end of hostilities.'° The question of when a period can accurately be described as being "after" hostilities may need to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Jus post bellum might, for instance, apply after a factual end of hostilities or after a Security Council Resolution. °5 conflicts.., which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized groups which... exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations .. Greater flexibility is also required with respect to possible length of application. Jus post bellum is a law of transition by definition. 16 This means that it must cease to apply at a certain moment.1 0 7
Traditionally, it has been argued that jus post bellum is aimed at the preservation or return to the legal status quo ante, which formed the logical endpoint of this concept. 0 8 Today, however, such a vision is overly restrictive.
It may fit in some cases of an international armed conflict where State A has invaded State B and State B fights back. However, it is of little use in cases where the effects of the use of force make the restoration of the pre-war situation impossible. 0 9 Moreover, the rationale of return to the status quo ante itself is misplaced in some contexts. If an intervention has been preceded by an internal armed conflict, it does not make sense to return to the situation that led to the conflict in the first place or to restore the social and political order that caused the humanitarian crisis."' In these cases, the establishment of fair and just peace requires positive transformations of the domestic order of a society, since peace settlement should 106. See STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 85, § 2.3 (stating that jus post bellum seeks to regulate the ending of wars and to ease the transition from war back to peace).
107. This type of cessation seems to originally have been envisioned by the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that many of its articles are no longer applicable "one year after the general close of military operations." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 6, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 973. However, the Convention struggles with the concept of jus post bellum ceasing at a specific point and extends the applicability of some provisions "for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that [a] Power exercises the functions of government in [a] territory." Id.; see Roberts, supra note 44, at 587-89 (discussing the timeline for cessation as a challenging concept, even at the time of drafting, and concluding that the concept now "bear[s] little or no relevance to actual occupations" because "not all occupations can be subject to exactly the same rules"). ideally achieve a higher level of human rights protection, accountability, and good governance than in the period before the resort to armed force." I A modem jus post bellum would be focused on the sustainability of peace, rather than on simply brokering an end to violence." 2 This focus gives jus post bellum a dynamic scope of application. It might come to apply in situations which are in reality in pacem or ante bellum.
B. THE CONTENT
The articulation of a legal jus post bellum requires further a refinement of its normative content." 3 Currently, there are various synergies between just war theory and propositions by legal scholars. But there is no agreement on a canon ofjus post bellum principles. 114 Moral philosophers have applied classical principles of just war theory when defining jus post bellum, such as just cause, right intention, public declaration, legitimate authority, discrimination and proportionality." 5 Brian Orend, for instance, offers the following principles: proportionality and publicity of the peace settlement, rights vindication, discrimination, punishment, compensation, and rehabilitation. 1 6 Bass suggests that a jus post bellum should 111. See Williams & Caldwell, supra note 3, at 316 (explaining that one principle ofjus post bellum is that "a war is conducted justly.., when the human rights of those involved in the war... are more secure than they were before the war").
112. See OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 181 (stating that a just peace demands an "ethical 'exit strategy"' in addition to a military one); DiMeglio, supra note 3, at 162 (arguing that securing a lasting peace is one of three criteria defining "the parameters of a just peace under the general framework of the just war tradition").
113. See STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 85, § 2.3 (stating that there is a "newness, unsettledness and controversy" connected with the definition and principles ofjus post bellum).
114. See OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 180-81 (listing some often "discussed and defended" settlement principles despite the need for "flexibility and sensitivity" within the canon).
115. See OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at (including all of these terms in his "coherent set of substantive principles for jus post bellum"); Bass, supra note 3, at 412 (considering prudence along with proportionality in his discussion ofjus post bellum).
116 Iraq, committed to seeing through a just post-conflict outcome and, "prepared to cede power to a legitimate and genuinely independent Iraqi government" that may, in the end, not act according to U.S. interests). legitimacy, civil rights, and the idea of a common good. We want wars to end with governments in power in the defeated states that are chosen by the people they rule-or, at least, recognized by them as legitimate-and that are visibly committed to the welfare of those same people (all of them). We want minorities protected against persecution, neighboring states protected against aggression, the poorest of the people protected against destitution and starvation.
122
These general principles are not so far removed from rules and principles which may be derived from a survey of international practice, such as a requirement of fairness and inclusiveness of peace settlements; the exclusion of territorial mutilation as punishment for aggression; the humanization of reparations and sanctions; the distinction between collective responsibility and individual responsibility; and accountability for mass crimes.' 23 However, they leave many questions unanswered. Firstly, the existing propositions continue to be shaped by just war theory, which was developed on the basis of the criteria of classical warfare. 1 24 Jus post bellum principles are thus focused on international armed conflicts. 1 25 Internal armed conflicts are widely ignored.
Secondly, problems arise when these principles are translated into a more concrete context, such as state-or nation-building. 126 One may easily agree with the argument that principles of accountability, popular consent, and closure-the sustainable assistance beyond the 122. Id. 123. See Carsten Stahn, Jus ad bellum -Jus in bello . . . Jus post bellum: Towards a Tripartite Conception of Armed Conflict, www.esilsedi.eu/english/pdf/Stahn2.PDF (discussing each of these principles in detail and advocating that they "form part of an emerging body of post-conflict law").
124. See James Turner Johnston, Just War, As It Was and Is, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 1, 2005, at 1-2 (describing the historical genesis of classic just war theory with a focus on its theological antecedents, and noting that the past forty years have seen a resurgence of the idea of just war in Christian ethical discourse).
125. See Rigby, supra note 3, at 179 (noting the increasing prevalence of intrastate wars in the past ten years). The author proposes that elements of durable peace settlements must take into account the unique issues posed by intra-state wars. , 2000) (presenting the central idea of an ongoing project to create a criminal code that contains the "basics of both law and procedure to enable an operation to apply due process using international jurists and internationally agreed standards").
See Michael von der Schulenburg, CRISIS MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE,
GOVERNMENT OUT OF A Box: SOME IDEAS OF DEVELOPING A TOOL BOX FOR PEACE-BUILDING 2-3 (2004), available at http://www.cmi.fi/files/GooB-report _2004.pdf (noting that these toolkits would aim to use modem technology to build infrastructure, a local civil service, and foster a sense of national ownership).
130. See OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 204-08 (suggesting a "ten-point recipe for reconstruction" while recognizing that each case will require special "ingredients").
See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,
31, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/502 (Oct. 20, 2000) (doubting "whether it would be practical, or even desirable given the diversity of country specific legal traditions, for the Secretariat to elaborate a model criminal code, whether worldwide, regional, or civil or common-law based, for use by future transitional administration missions").
132. See, e.g., Walzer, Just and Unjust Occupations, supra note 42, at 61-63 (noting that the four year occupation of Nazi Germany was necessary to bring Nazi leaders to trial and institute general "denazification," while in Iraq, it might be argued that an extended occupation and comparable "debaathification" is not assistance in state-building is requested or required in a specific situation, opinions differ greatly concerning the desirable strategy to be applied. 33 Some authorities, such as Roland Paris, argue that institutionalization should generally come before liberalization and standard-setting in order to provide space for domestic dialogue about normative principles of a domestic polity. 1 3 4 Others suggest that action in specific sectors such as criminal justice and the rule of law should be prioritized immediately after conflict in order to put the process of peace-building on the right track from the start. 35 Thirdly, it is still unclear in existing literature from which sources such principles are and ought to be derived.1 36 In contemporary scholarship, moral or legal considerations-soft law-are often interwoven with policy assessments or recommendations. This turn necessary because a majority of the population was not a part of the Baath regime).
133. See ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR'S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 185-87 (2004) (summarizing the approaches of different theorists to peace-building). For example, the author contrasts the arguments "in favor of restricting political participation and political mobilization" with other commentators' emphasis on the "psychological sources of unrest during the modernization process." Id. at 186 n.22.
134. See id. at 185-88 (examining methods of turning war-tom states into liberal market democracies by avoiding the "destabilizing side effects" of liberalization). Paris explains that peace-builders tend to believe that elections have a pacifying effect without considering their potential negative effects. Id. at 188-89. The proposed solution for peacebuilders includes the following: 1) postponing elections until moderate political parties have been created, and mechanisms to ensure compliance with the results of the election have been established; 2) designing electoral rules that reward moderation instead of extremism; 3) encouraging the development of civil-society organizations that cut across lines of societal conflict . . . ; 4) regulating incendiary 'hate speech'; 5) promoting economic reforms that moderate rather than exacerbate societal tensions; and 6) developing effective security institutions and a professional, neutral bureaucracy.
Id.

See Simon Chesterman, Walking Softly in Afghanistan:
The Future of UN State-Building, SURVIVAL, Autumn 2002, at 37, 37-38 (examining the United Nation's "light footprint" approach in the context of Afghanistan, where it has focused on strengthening Afghan capacity to promote sustainability and a sense of national ownership).
136. See Stahn, supra note 123, at 4 (noting that the source of post-conflict law is unclear because "few attempts have been undertaken to ... fill the notion of post-conflict law with concrete legal content," but stating that there is a modem tendency "to move from a statist and national-interest driven conception of conflict termination to a pluralist and problem-solving approach to peacemaking").
in order to identify reliable organizing principles for post-conflict peace.
C. "JUS POST BELLUM" IN OPERATION
Last but not least, it is necessary to clarify the relationship between jus post bellum,jus ad bellum, and jus in bello.
Here again, it is clear that the classical conceptions of just war theory cannot simply be transposed to a modem legal setting. 142 Just war theorists and international lawyers may agree with the general proposition that the idea of peacemaking after war is, to some extent, rooted in jus ad bellum.
14 3 However, both disciplines tend to have different point of departures concerning the application of the principle of distinction. 144
Philosophers have challenged the independence of the (moral) principles of jus in bello and jus ad bellum. 14 5 The basic assumption of the principle of distinction, namely that the justification of the recourse to force has no bearing on rights and obligations of combatants in war, has been questioned from a moral point of view. 146 It has been argued that, as a matter of morality, it is "simply not... permissible to fight in a war with an unjust cause" since "acts of war that promote an unjust cause cannot be proportionate" and discriminate in terms of the harm that they inflict. 14 7 The same claim has been made with respect to jus post bellum. It has been argued that the "[f]ailure to meetjus ad bellum results in automatic failure to meetjus in bello andjus post bellum" and that from a moral point of view "any serious defection, by any participant, from these principles of just war settlement should be seen as a violation of the rules of just war termination, and so should be punished." 148 Such an approach stands in opposition to the traditional stance of international lawyers who have fought for recognition of the principle of distinction over the past century. 5 0 The general separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello became common ground in international law in the second half of the twentieth century.' It is inter alia reflected in the separate codification of aggression and war crimes in the statutory instruments of international criminal tribunals' 52 and the Preamble to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions which clarifies that the provisions of the Protocol apply in all circumstances without distinction based on the "nature or origin" of the underlying conflict.' 5 3 This principle is designed to absolve compliance with the law from disputes over the causes of armed conflict and meant to enhance protection for victims of violence.
International lawyers would naturally plea for an extension of the principle of distinction tojus post bellum. This separation comes into play in the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus post bellum. Obligations under jus post bellum would apply in an objective fashion: All sides are under an obligation to settle disputes in a fair and just fashion after the conflict, irrespective of the cause and legality of the original use of force. A similar consideration governs the relationship between jus post bellum and jus in bello. The jus post bellum must 6 priori be independent from compliance with jus in bello. If a party violates its obligations under jus in bello, it does not lose its entitlement to a fair treatment under jus post bellum. Some of the very concepts ofjus post bellum are designed to remedy previous violations of jus ad bellum or jus in bello-state responsibility, individual criminal responsibility, compensation, etc. 1
54
The starting point of the legal discipline (the neutral application of jus in bello) is thus different from just war theory.
Nevertheless, even under contemporary international law, the separation ofjus ad bellum andjus in bello is not an absolute rule.' 55 There is a certain convergence in the objectives ofjus ad bellum and jus in bello. 56 Both branches of law ultimately pursue a common rationale, namely to make war a less "viable option" in international relations. 57 Moreover, the scope of application of the principle of distinction itself is limited.
In some cases, it does not make sense at all to argue in terms of the principle of distinction. The operation of the classical principle of distinction is based on the assumption of the identity of parties to a conflict under jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 58 Modem armed violence, however, is more complex. In the case of authorized collective security operations, it is doubtful whether there are two 154. Stahn, supra note 2, at 936. 155. See Bouvier, supra note 150, at 111 (noting that the distinction betweenjus ad bellum andjus in bello has been challenged in the last twenty-five years). The challenges have rested on at least five grounds including "humanitarian intervention," "collective security operations," "asymmetric conflicts," the "war on terror," and the "possible subordination of jus in bello tojus ad bellum." Id. 156. See Mgret, supra note 81, at 121-23 (acknowledging that the two may "operate more on a continuum than as parallel tracks").
157. See id. at 123 (suggesting that in addition to making war a less viable option, 'jus ad bellum andjus in bello are converging towards making war either illegal or... onerous legally").
158. See id. at 121 (noting that, according to jus in bello, "[w]hat makes war war" is that "it is conducted by the sovereign").
CONCLUSION
The concept of jus post bellum has gained new attention in contemporary scholarship. But its current theorization is still unsatisfactory in several respects. The concept is praised as a promising instrument to enhance the sustainability of peace after conflict, but it is often presented in a one-sided fashion and defined without consideration of related disciplines. This vision should be revisited. At least two factors require further attention.
The first is the general lack of attention to the legal dimensions of jus post bellum. The concept itself emerged in the tradition of just war theory, but it has been widely ignored in the legal discipline. This gap may be explained by some structural grounds that are rooted in the development of international law in the twentieth century, but it is increasingly open to challenge from a normative point of view. The exclusive reference to moral obligations in the theorization of transitions from conflict to peace fails to recognize the existing net of legal rules and principles in this area. Contemporary developments suggest that it is time to take the concept ofjus post bellum seriously as a legal paradigm, both in the context of just war theory and within the legal community.
Second, there is a certain tendency in contemporary scholarship to conflate or misconstrue the mutual roles of law and morality. The fact that a legal jus post bellum may be traced back to a historical tradition does not mean that the classical moral and the legal paradigm must be identical. Moral theory and legal science share distinct origins and rationales and approach the relationship between jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum from different angles. Moral philosophy is primarily concerned with the moral justification of warfare, under which the operation of the principles of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum is closely connected to the overall cause, just or unjust, of the recourse to force. Jus post bellum serves primarily as a benchmark to evaluate the legitimacy and ethical implications of interventions. International lawyers, by contrast, tend to view each of these categories as autonomous rules of behavior, with the aim of maximizing compliance and respect for human dignity. It is therefore not contradictory to construe jus post bellum differently in each discipline.
Nevertheless, the conceptual development of jus post bellum requires more inter-disciplinary discourse. Scholars from different communities would benefit from a closer look at related disciplines. Some of the current (mis)perceptions of the role of moral parameters in the theorization of jus post bellurn might be adjusted if just war theorists paid greater attention to the impact of legal rules and principles. Conversely, the legal discipline may draw valuable insights from the content of the classical jus post bellum under just war doctrine and historical sources when defining the contours ofjus post bellum in modem international law.
